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MASTER OF THE PETITION: EXPLORING THE TENSION 
BETWEEN THE PTAB AND PETITIONERS IN CONTROLLING THE 
SCOPE OF AIA TRIALS† 
RAJA N. SALIBA* & GRANT SHACKELFORD** 
The assignment of effective control over the scope of trials before the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“Office”) under the America Invents Act of 2012 (AIA) has been 
an area of controversy since implementation of the Act. In SAS Institute 
Inc. v. Iancu, the question of control arose in the context of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 318(a), and whether that provision requires the PTAB to issue a final 
written decision on all claims challenged by the petitioner in an inter partes 
review, allowing the scope of the petition to “guide the life of the litiga-
tion,” or instead permitted the Board to follow a practice, ostensibly author-
ized under Office rules, of instituting review as to only some claims chal-
lenged in the petition, and denying review as to the remaining claims.1 
Shortly before this Article went to press, in a 5-4 majority opinion written 
by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held that, while the PTAB has dis-
cretion over whether to institute an inter partes review,2 if review is insti-
tuted the plain text of 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) imposes a nondiscretionary duty 
on the PTAB to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentabil-
ity of all patent claims challenged by the petitioner, and does not permit 
denial of institution as to a subset of challenged claims.3   
In reaching its decision, the Court brushed aside policy arguments that 
had been raised concerning the wisdom of this all-or-nothing approach: 
 
Each side offers plausible reasons why its approach might 
make for the more efficient policy. But who should win 
that debate isn’t our call to make. Policy arguments are 
properly addressed to Congress, not this Court. It is Con-
 
† ©2018. This Article represents the personal views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 
views of any colleague, organization or client thereof. 
* Partner, Sughrue Mion, Washington, D.C. 
** Associate, Sughrue Mion, Washington, D.C. 
 1.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, No. 16-969, slip op. at 1, 8, 584 U.S. __, __, __ (2018). 
 2.  SAS Inst. Inc, slip op. at 8. 
 3.  Id. at 4. 
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gress’s job to enact policy and it is this Court’s job to fol-
low the policy Congress has prescribed. And whatever its 
virtues or vices, Congress’s prescribed policy here is clear: 
the petitioner in an inter partes review is entitled to a deci-
sion on all the claims it has challenged.4  
 
While the Court based its decision on the plain statutory language, 
policy considerations over whether a petitioner in an AIA trial should have 
a measure of control over which claims are litigated before the PTAB, 
similar to a plaintiff in federal court who is master of the complaint, were at 
the center of oral argument before the Court last November.5 The practical 
implications of the Court’s all-or-nothing mandate are likely to remain a 
primary concern of the PTAB as well as practitioners going forward. As 
such, the colloquy between the Justices and the parties during oral argu-
ment is instructive in considering the future ramifications of SAS Institute’s 
all-or-nothing approach for instituting inter partes reviews.  
At oral argument before the Court, counsel for the Petitioner in SAS 
Institute argued: 
 
Counsel for Petitioner, SAS Institute Inc.: The ordinary prin-
ciple that the petitioner or the plaintiff in litigation is the master 
of its complaint, we—because so many of these cases follow liti-
gation, we know best what claims we’re likely to be facing in lit-
igation.6 
 
The Government, defending the PTAB’s decision below, took a dif-
ferent view, arguing that the “notion of [‘]master of the complaint[’] just 
doesn’t translate” to AIA trials: 
 
Assistant to U.S. Solicitor General: [T]hat’s an important fea-
ture of inter partes review, that this notion of master of the com-
plaint just doesn’t translate here, one, because [35 U.S.C.] Sec-
tion 311(b) doesn’t say you may get review of anything you 
want, but you may get review only of these kinds of things, but 
more fundamentally because the point of this scheme is to give 
 
 4.   Id. at 10–11. 
 5.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Matal, No. 16-969 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2017). Mr. Matal served as interim 
director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 6.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 24:7–12, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969). 
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the agency an opportunity to reconsider decisions in the form of 
patent claims it’s previously issued.7 
 
This Article primarily explores the policy question of who should con-
trol the issues addressed in AIA trials. We (1) compare AIA trials with dis-
trict court actions and then (2) examine the question answered in SAS Insti-
tute, focusing on statements made during oral argument with respect to 
potential practical problems associated with defining the scope of AIA tri-
als at institution. 
I. THE PTAB AFFORDS PARTIES FILING CASES LESS CONTROL 
OVER THE SCOPE OF ISSUES FOR TRIAL THAN DISTRICT 
COURTS. 
A central issue in SAS Institute is whether a petitioner in an inter 
partes review should be given control over the scope of the proceeding, 
consistent with the principle that the plaintiff in a district court action ordi-
narily is the master of its complaint.8 To examine this question, it is helpful 
to compare the nature of AIA trials with that of district court actions. 
The majority decision in SAS Institute recognized a similarity between 
inter partes review and civil litigation: 
 
Much as in the civil litigation system it mimics, in an inter 
partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and 
normally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, 
not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address.9 
 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, was less persuaded by similarities between inter partes review 
and civil litigation, finding more significant the specialized agency aspects 
of inter partes review for reexamining earlier grants: 
 
Neither am I helped by analogizing the inter partes review 
proceeding to civil litigation. Cf. ante, at 2–3, 5. That is 
because, as this Court said in Cuozzo, inter partes review is 
a “hybrid proceeding.” It has some adversarial characteris-
 
 7.  Id. at 64:13–23. 
 8.  See Brief for Petitioner at 24, SAS Inst., No. 16-969 (citing Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002)). 
 9.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, No. 16-969, slip op. at 5, 584 U.S. __, __ (2018). 
    
82 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 17:3 
tics, but “in other significant respects, inter partes review is 
less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized 
agency proceeding.” Its purposes are not limited to “help-
ing resolve concrete patent-related disputes among par-
ties,” but extend to “reexamin[ing] . . . an earlier adminis-
trative grant of a patent” and “protect[ing] the public’s 
‘paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . 
are kept within their legitimate scope.’”10 
  
Distinct from inter partes reexaminations, the former proceedings they 
replaced, AIA trials are said to be adjudicatory proceedings, not examina-
tional proceedings before the Patent Office.11 Congress intended that these 
trials provide “another means to administratively challenge the validity of a 
patent at the [Patent Office]—creating a cost-effective alternative to formal 
litigation.”12 As discussed below, while generally adjudicatory in nature, 
AIA trials differ in important ways from district court actions, particularly 
with respect to scope and control of the proceedings. 
District court civil actions generally begin with relatively broad claims 
and counterclaims set forth in the parties’ notice pleadings, with issues then 
crystallizing towards trial.13 Actions commence upon filing the complaint 
and generally proceed on all issues the plaintiff chose to raise in its com-
plaint.14 In a complaint for patent infringement, for example, a plaintiff 
may assert multiple patents,15 and under certain circumstances may name 
 
 10.  SAS Inst., slip op. at 6–7 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 11.  See Ariosa Diagnostics v. ISIS Innovation Ltd., IPR2012-00022, Paper 166 at 51 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 2, 2014) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1 at 46–47 (2011)) (the AIA “converts inter partes 
reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding, and renames the proceeding ‘inter 
partes review.’”); see also id. at 75; 157 CONG. REC. 3429–30 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl) (“Among 
the reforms that are expected to expedite these proceedings [is] the shift from an examinational to an 
adjudicative model”); cf. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (characteriz-
ing inter partes review as “hybrid proceeding,” having adjudicatory aspects “helping resolve concrete 
patent-related disputes among parties” as well as examinational aspects “help[ing] protect the public’s 
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.”) (inter-
nal quotation omitted). Questions as to the nature of AIA trials may also be addressed in Oil States En-
ergy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC (No. 16-712), which raises constitutional questions 
regarding AIA trials, and was argued the same day as SAS Institute.  
 12.  157 CONG. REC. S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 157 
CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 13.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief”); see also, e.g., Scripps Research Inst. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 16-CV-661-
JLS-BGS, 2016 WL 6834024, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (“to adequately plead direct infringe-
ment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that a defendant’s accused instrumentali-
ty contains each limitation of the asserted patent claim.”).  
 14.  FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 15.  See, e.g., Hearing Components Inc. v. Shure Inc., No. 9:07-CV-104, 2008 WL 2485426 (E.D. 
Tex. June 13, 2008) (asserting multiple patents); Fenster Family Patent Holdings Inc. v. Siemens Med. 
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multiple defendants.16 Claim construction hearings address the construction 
of the asserted patent claims, following discovery that may broadly encom-
pass “relevant” information, allowing the parties to develop their theories 
as litigation proceeds.17 Importantly, district court actions are not statutorily 
limited in duration. 
By contrast, in AIA trials the issues are generally crystallized at the 
outset, beginning with a petition limited to a single patent and setting forth 
in detail each proposed ground of unpatentability on a claim by claim ba-
sis.18 The petition must be accompanied by all of the petitioner’s evidence 
supporting its case-in-chief, including any direct testimony in the form of 
sworn declarations or affidavits.19 Prior to its decision on institution, the 
Board gives the patent owner an opportunity to file a preliminary response, 
including supporting evidence.20 Then the Board makes the decision 
whether to institute trial, and the scope thereof, based on these papers.21 Of-
fice rules governing inter partes reviews and post-grant reviews expressly 
permit the PTAB to institute a proceeding on less than all the challenged 
claims and, or, less than all proposed grounds of unpatentability.22 Claim 
construction is addressed up front, in the pre-institution papers and decision 
on institution, obviating a formal Markman hearing.23 Discovery in AIA 
trials is generally limited to the evidence filed in support of the parties’ 
briefs (i.e., petition and patent owner response) and cross-examination of 
 
Sols. USA Inc., No. 04-0038, 2005 WL 2304190 (D. Del. Sept. 20, 2005) (same); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing LP, 326 F. Supp. 1060, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (same).  
 16.  See 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2012) (joinder of accused infringers). 
 17.  FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(1) (providing that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 
case” and “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be dis-
coverable”). 
 18.  35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a), 322(a); see also Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,764 
(Aug. 14, 2012) (“where a party believes that a specific term has meaning other than its plain meaning, 
the party should provide a statement identifying a proposed construction of the particular term and 
where the disclosure supports that meaning.”); Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1309, 1312 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (O’Malley opinion) (“[T]he petitioner raises its best arguments at the outset; 
the patent owner has the opportunity to adjust the scope of its claims if need be; and the Board provides 
a speedy ruling as to the patentability of the original and amended claims.”).  
 19.  35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3)(B) (2015). 
 20.  Id. § 313. While patent owners may file testimonial evidence with a preliminary response, the 
PTAB will resolve any issues of material fact created by testimony submitted with a preliminary re-
sponse in favor of the petitioner for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. 37 C.F.R. §§ 
42.108(c), 42.208(c) (2017). 
 21.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a)–(b), 315(c), 324 (a) & (c), 325(c); see also America Invents Act 
§ 18(a)(1)(E) (2011); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108(a)–(b), 42.208(a)–(b), 42.300(a). 
 22.  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108(a)–(b), 42.208(a)–(b). 
 23.  See id. §§ 42.104(b)(3), 42.204(b)(3).  
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declarants.24 Absent a showing of good cause, an AIA trial must be con-
cluded within twelve months following institution.25 
What this comparison demonstrates is that AIA trials, although adju-
dicatory, differ from district court actions in many ways, one of the most 
important differences being the PTAB’s control at institution over the 
scope of the proceeding—the source of the dispute in SAS Institute.26 Un-
like in district court, where the plaintiff by virtue of its complaint has a sig-
nificant degree of control over the scope of its case, the petitioner in an 
AIA trial is accorded less control over the claims litigated. Although the 
petitioner has discretion whether to file a petition, and on what grounds, the 
PTAB has discretion over whether to institute trial.27 Accordingly, by statu-
tory design, ultimate control over institution in an AIA proceeding rests 
with the PTAB. 
That the issues in AIA trials are crystallized at the outset underscores 
the significance of the PTAB’s decisions regarding institution. These deci-
sions contain the PTAB’s preliminary findings as to the “reasonable likeli-
hood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the 
claims challenged in the petition,”28 and are issued by the same panel of 
Administrative Patent Judges tasked with overseeing the trial and issuing 
the final written decision.29 Therefore, it is no surprise that the PTAB’s de-
cision on institution is a good predictor of the ultimate outcome of trial.30 
 
 24.  Rules pertaining to discovery are set forth in id. §§ 42.51–.55; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 23–26; 
SCHOTT Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Co., IPR2013-00358, Paper 43 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2014) 
(“Discovery in an inter partes review proceeding . . . is less than what is normally available in district 
court patent litigation, as Congress intended inter partes review to be a quick and cost effective alterna-
tive to litigation.”), aff’d w/o op., 612 F. App’x 614 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2015) (per curiam) (nonprece-
dential). 
 25.  35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2014) (setting forth the one-year deadline and also provides that the 
Director may, for good cause shown, extend this deadline by up to six months).  
 26.  The petitioner in SAS Institute based its arguments on 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and the belief that 
this statute requires the PTAB’s final written decision to address all claims challenged in its petition. 
See Brief of Petitioner at 18, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Matal, 138 S. Ct. 350 (2017) (No. 16-969). However, the 
issue at least arguably originates from the PTAB’s decision to institute trial on less than all of the chal-
lenged claims, precluding the SAS Institute petitioner from litigating all of its claims in a single forum. 
See id. at 28. 
 27.  See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108(b), 42.208(b). 
 28.  See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012); see also id. § 324(a) (setting forth the threshold for instituting 
post grant reviews as whether “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is 
more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“[t]here is nothing in the Constitution or the statute that precludes the same Board panel from making 
the decision to institute and then rendering the final decision.”), reh’g en banc denied, 826 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 625 (2017). 
 30.  According to the Patent Office as of December 31, 2017, of all final written decisions, 65% 
found all instituted claims unpatentable, 16% found some instituted claims unpatentable, and only 19% 
found no instituted claim unpatentable. See AIA Trial Statistics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
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Notwithstanding the important role of the PTAB’s decision on institu-
tion, the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee con-
firmed that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) precludes judicial review of this decision, at 
least with respect to the PTAB’s determination whether the petition estab-
lishes a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.31 As a result, the PTAB 
retains control over the issues litigated and decided in an AIA trial—an is-
sue central to the question in SAS Institute. 
II. WHAT CONTROL SHOULD THE PTAB HAVE OVER THE SCOPE 
OF ISSUES IN AN AIA TRIAL? 
At issue in SAS Institute is the mandatory scope of the PTAB’s final 
written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), which provides: “If an inter 
partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final written decision with respect to 
the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any 
new claim added under section 316(d).”32 Until SAS Institute struck down 
the practice, it was not uncommon for the PTAB to issue a partial institu-
tion decision allowing trial to proceed on less than all challenged claims.33 
SAS presented the question whether the statutory language in § 318(a) pro-
hibits the PTAB from issuing a final written decision that addresses patent-
ability of only some of the claims challenged in the petition.34 Likening the 
petitioner in an AIA trial to a plaintiff who is master of the complaint in a 
district court action, SAS argued that, under § 318(a), if an AIA trial is in-
stituted it should in almost all circumstances conclude with a final written 
decision on the patentability of all claims challenged in the petition.35 
At oral argument, SAS argued that the statutory language presents the 
PTAB with a binary set of alternatives: if the PTAB in its discretion de-
cides to institute a proceeding, then it is required to issue a final written de-
cision on all challenged claims.36 SAS contended that its interpretation 
 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/statistics/aia-trial-
statistics (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 31. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139–42 (2016); see also 35 U.S.C. § 
314(d); Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 32.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Matal, 138 S. Ct. 350 (2017) (No. 16-
969) (emphasis added). 
 33.  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108(b), 208(b) (2017) (permitting the PTAB to issue a partial institution 
decisions); see also Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in 
Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 78 (2016) (reporting that for 
inter partes review petitions filed by March 31, 2014, about 58% of institution decisions that granted 
review did so as to less than all of the challenged claims). 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  Brief for Petitioner at 24, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969). 
 36.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12:25–13:3, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969). 
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aligned with the AIA’s purpose of creating an effective, efficient, and fair 
system for determining patentability.37 By contrast, SAS argued, a final 
written decision that does not address the patentability of all challenged 
claims forces litigants to confront validity challenges in two separate tribu-
nals and thus “destroys the carefully crafted provisions of the America In-
vents Act . . . intended to be an efficient substitute for district-court invalid-
ity litigation.”38 
Several Justices acknowledged at oral argument that the statutory lan-
guage appeared to aid SAS’s case.39 However, this acknowledgement was 
tempered by concerns that SAS’s interpretation would result in an end-run 
around the Court’s recent decision in Cuozzo: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: Well, I don’t see what else you’re try-
ing to do, because what will you do? You will come up on 
appeal and say the Board was wrong in not instituting re-
view of those other claims? That’s what Cuozzo was about, 
us saying you can’t do that.40 
 
SAS disagreed, arguing that because § 318(a) relates to the ultimate 
question of patentability of all challenged claims in the final written deci-
sion and not review of the PTAB’s reasonable basis determination in the 
decision on institution: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: So would the review on appeal be on 
the basis of a motion—like a motion to dismiss? On the 
face of whatever you presented the Board with, at the be-
ginning, did the Board have a reasonable basis to conclude 
that no reasonable basis existed to challenge the validity of 
that claim? 
 
 37.  Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969). 
 38.  Id.; see also id. at 29–30. Furthermore, SAS argued, the PTAB’s decision in SAS Inst. to insti-
tute on challenged claim 4, but not challenged claim 2, which the Board believes is broader in scope 
than claim 4, “not only propagat[es] inefficiencies . . . , but, as in this case, an unreviewable absurdity.” 
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969). SAS argues that as a result “the 
parties will have to relitigate the patentability of [claim 2] in the district court,” which is “exactly the 
kind of ‘administrative obstinacy’ that . . . prevents the statutory provisions from ‘act[ing] in harmony, 
like a well-oiled machine.’” Id. at 9. 
 39.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 25:19–26:5, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969) (“I have 
no doubt that the language you point to helps you, but where I run into trouble is I can’t imagine how a 
statute is supposed to work where you, objecting, say: I object to 10 claims, all right? Now we look at 
this and say: You’re going to get that grant; if just one of those 10 claims is reasonable likelihood, 
you’ll prevail.”) (J. Breyer). 
 40.  Id. at 6:9–14. 
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SAS: No, the review would not be over the reasonable ba-
sis or not. The review would be on the question of patenta-
bility.41 
 
The Justices also expressed concerns that implementation of SAS’s 
statutory interpretation would create due process issues and be unworka-
ble.42 Justice Sotomayor appeared to suggest that due process concerns 
might only be remedied with an all-or-nothing approach: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: What you really want to say is the 
Board shouldn’t institute partial reviews . . . . I think what 
you’re saying is, once it determines you have enough evi-
dence to challenge one claim, it should hold a hearing on 
everything. Because without that, you can’t really decide 
patentability in a due process way, in a fair way. So why 
have you limited your challenge in the way you have? 
What’s the purpose of doing that? And what advantage 
does that give you? It seems to me that it’s an unfair ad-
vantage to the other side. 
It’s an unfair advantage to the system. So why don’t you 
just argue what you really want to argue, which is, I should 
have an opportunity to litigate all of my claims? 
 
SAS: Well, that’s exactly—that is exactly our argument. 
We should have the opportunity to litigate them . . . .43 
 
Based on this exchange, SAS in effect appeared to advocate an all-or-
nothing approach, wherein if institution is warranted as to at least one chal-
lenged claim, either: (1) the non-instituted claims are not litigated during 
trial, but are still addressed in the final written decision and subject to ap-
peal; or (2) the petitioner is given the opportunity to litigate all of its chal-
lenged claims during the trial. Either approach raises complications. 
Under the first approach, notwithstanding a detailed petition and a de-
tailed decision on institution, the record at the end of trial would be incom-
plete, as it would lack the patent owner’s full arguments and evidence with 
 
 41.  Id. at 8:13–24. 
 42.  See id. at 10:21–11:17. 
 43.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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respect to the non-instituted claims subject to appeal. This is because the 
patent owner files a preliminary response prior to a decision on institution, 
at which time the patent owner is not permitted an opportunity to obtain 
discovery, including cross-examination of the petitioner’s declarants, and 
indeed is, by rule, not fully credited by the Board for purposes of determin-
ing whether to institute.44 Following a decision on institution, logically the 
patent owner’s papers and evidence would largely be limited to patentabil-
ity of the instituted claims. Accordingly, on appeal, as to the “non-
instituted” claims the Federal Circuit would be left to decide fact-intensive 
questions of patentability based on an incomplete record.45 
Also unclear under this approach would be the treatment of estoppel. 
While SAS, apparently seeking to allay concerns about fairness and effi-
ciency, argued that estoppel would apply to the non-instituted challenged 
claims,46 it is unclear whether this position is consistent with the applicable 
statutory language regarding estoppel. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), for ex-
ample, regardless whether a subsequent proceeding is in court or the Of-
fice, estoppel from a prior IPR applies to “any ground that the petitioner 
raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review” 
(emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has held that this language does not 
apply to grounds that a petitioner raises in its petition but upon which the 
PTAB does not institute an AIA trial.47 Thus, SAS’s view, under which es-
toppel would apply to claims that are included in the final written decision 
but are not litigated during the trial, appears to be in tension with the Fed-
eral Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory language.48 
It is also unclear how estoppel would apply to alternative grounds of 
unpatentability for non-instituted claims (e.g., anticipation and obviousness 
based on different combinations of references). Again, to the extent the 
PTAB does not institute trial on certain grounds, under current law the peti-
 
 44.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2017); see also supra note 18. 
 45.  The Federal Circuit has explained that “[i]n appeals from the PTAB, ‘we have before us a 
comprehensive record that contains the arguments and evidence presented by the parties and our review 
of the [PTAB]’s decision is confined to the four corners of that record.’” In re Nuvasive, 842 F.3d 
1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Federal 
Circuit further added, “[w]e ‘cannot exercise [our] duty of review unless [we] are advised of the consid-
erations underlying the action under review.’ Indeed, ‘the orderly functioning of the process of review 
requires that the grounds upon which the [PTAB] acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.’” 
Nuvasive, 842 F.3d at 1382 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)). 
 46.  Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 350 (No. 16-969). 
 47.  Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016). 
 48.  Moreover, while SAS itself might be willing to subject itself to estoppel for non-instituted 
claims, it would appear that most petitioners would not benefit from such an expansion of estoppel. 
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tioner is not estopped from re-litigating those non-instituted grounds.49 
Whether the decision in SAS Institute maintains this situation, and contin-
ues to permit institution on fewer than all grounds, is arguably unclear. The 
question was not before the Court, and the Court did not expressly address 
it.  Complicating the matter further, although the PTAB sometimes denies 
institution of alternate proposed grounds on the merits, it sometimes does 
so based on practical considerations, relating to the board’s ability to com-
plete review within the prescribed one-year time limit, and not reflective of 
a substantive decision on patentability.50 At the present, however, this issue 
may be moot in view of the USPTO’s published guidance following SAS 
Institute that “the PTAB will institute as to all claims or none. At this time, 
if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges 
raised in the petition.”51 
The second of the two posited approaches, in which all challenged 
claims are tried, requiring the parties to argue and introduce evidence with 
respect to each claim, would raise its own issues of fairness and efficiency. 
Under that approach, a patent owner could be hauled before the PTAB to 
defend the patentability of all of its claims upon the showing by the peti-
tioner of a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability as to only a single 
claim. This effect of sweeping into trial claims for which there is no rea-
sonable question of unpatentability might encourage gamesmanship, and 
unjustly favor petitioners seeking to stay related concurrent district court 
actions.52 The patent owner faces further burdens here, due to the word 
count limitations for the patent owner responses, which would hinder its 
ability to develop arguments for each claim.53 
Another possible difficulty with this second approach is that it could 
encourage the PTAB to focus its decision on institution on only a single 
claim, deferring a more complete analysis of all the challenged claims until 
its final written decision. This result would deprive the parties of the bene-
fit of the PTAB’s expertise at the time of institution, which can help focus 
the issues and encourage settlement.54 
 
 49.  Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1299–1300. 
 50.  Id. at 1299 n.2. 
 51.  Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. (April 
26, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_the_impact_of_sas_on_aia_trial_pro
ceedings_%20%28april_26%2C_2018%29.pdf (last visited Apr 26, 2018). 
 52.  See NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111, at *5–6 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (“courts have been nearly uniform in granting motions to stay proceedings in 
the trial court after the PTAB has instituted inter partes review proceedings”). 
 53.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017). 
 54.  See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“There are 
strong public policy reasons to favor settlement between the parties to a proceeding.”). 
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For these reasons, SAS’s proposed all-or-nothing approach may be 
problematic. However, an alternative third approach raised by Justice Ken-
nedy at oral argument and by Justice Ginsburg’s written dissent may pro-
vide a workable compromise, which could address SAS’s concern of 
piecemeal adjudication and the litigation of patentability challenges in mul-
tiple tribunals, and might be implementable without statutory changes: 
 
Justice Kennedy: Could the Board contact the parties and 
say, we will not grant review as to all of the challenges 
claimed, but if you reduce it to just claims 3 and 4, we will 
hear it? Could the Board do that?55 
 
Justice Gorsuch revisited Justice Kennedy’s question later in oral ar-
gument and suggested that such an approach might be workable, recogniz-
ing that the PTAB “could do what Justice Kennedy said. That—that 
would—everybody agrees would remain an available choice.”56 SAS and 
the Patent Office likewise agreed.57  
This suggestion resurfaced when the case was decided. In her written 
dissent from the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, took up this point and noted that the PTAB 
“could simply deny a petition containing challenges having no ‘reasonable 
likelihood’ of success, §314(a). Simultaneously, the Board might note that 
one or more specified claims warrant reexamination, while others chal-
lenged in the petition do not. Petitioners would then be free to file new or 
amended petitions shorn of challenges the Board finds unworthy of inter 
partes review.”58 However, notwithstanding Justice Gorsuch’s apparent 
sympathy with this proposition during oral argument, the majority opinion 
in a footnote questioned whether such a stratagem would be consistent with 
the statute’s requirements.59 
Under the take-it-or-leave-it approach suggested by Justices Kennedy 
and Ginsburg, prior to institution, the PTAB could provide the petitioner 
with the choice of either: (1) withdrawing its patentability challenges that 
are deemed by the PTAB not to have met the threshold standard for institu-
tion; or (2) withdrawing the petition altogether. The first choice would al-
 
 55.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 20:6–17, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Matal, 138 S. Ct. 350 (2017) (No. 
16-969). 
 56.  See id. at 60:19–22. 
 57.  See id. at 20:6–17, 60:19–61:4. 
 58.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, No. 16-969, 584 U.S. at __ (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (slip op. at 1).  
 59.  See SAS Inst., slip op. at 11, n*. 
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low the trial to proceed and a final written decision to address all chal-
lenged claims for which the PTAB concluded petitioner had established a 
reasonable likelihood of unpatentability. The second choice would allow 
the petitioner to avoid piecemeal adjudication and proceed directly in dis-
trict court. Importantly, the choice is left to the petitioner, who filed the pe-
tition in the first place, and would be most familiar with the underlying dis-
pute between the parties. 
This take-it-or-leave-it approach could even be implemented without 
substantially changing the “playing field.” The first choice (the petitioner 
withdrawing its challenges to certain claims) leaves the patent owner in 
much the same position as under the current statutory scheme, where an 
AIA trial proceeds only with respect to instituted claims. An amended peti-
tion challenging fewer claims than in the original petition could be deemed 
to have the same filing date as the original petition so as to avoid triggering 
the statutory one-year bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).60 Under the second 
choice (the petitioner withdrawing its petition), the patent owner would 
stand in the presumably more favorable position of having to defend its pa-
tent claims only in its initial choice of forum, i.e., the district court. 
Furthermore, regardless of which choice the petitioner selects, the 
scope of estoppel would remain the same as under the current scheme.61 
That is, the petitioner would seemingly not be estopped with respect to any 
withdrawn claims, which would not be instituted, and thus not “raised dur-
ing that inter partes review.”62 
Admittedly, this “take-it-or-leave-it” approach raises potential con-
cerns of its own. For example, allowing a petitioner to withdraw a petition 
after the PTAB has identified a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability 
with respect to at least one of the challenged claims seems contrary to one 
objective of AIA trials—allowing the Office to review its earlier decisions 
and “help[] protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent 
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.’”63 It is arguably in-
consistent with this objective for the Office to ignore a likely patentability 
error that has already come to its attention under § 314. On the other hand, 
under the current scheme the PTAB already allows parties to terminate a 
 
 60.  Currently, the Board’s rules make allowance for correction of certain clerical mistakes. See 37 
C.F.R. § 42.104(c) (2012). 
 61.  See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
 62.  Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1299–1300 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
 63.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (quoting Precision In-
strument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, 
pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011) (Inter partes review is an “efficient system for challenging patents that should not 
have issued”)). 
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proceeding by settlement after the PTAB’s institution decision even after 
such potential errors have been identified.64 
Another question raised by the take-it-or-leave-it approach is whether 
the Office should publish preliminary findings with respect to the petition-
er’s challenged claims. The petitioner, for example, might be reluctant to 
make an election absent the opportunity to review the Office’s rationales 
set forth in a decision on institution. On the other hand, publication of the 
Office’s preliminary findings would arguably amount to an advisory opin-
ion.65 District courts’ treatment on the admissibility of such tentative opin-
ions may raise complex questions.66 
Another consideration is the impact of this approach on the pre-
institution schedule. Section 314(b) requires that the PTAB issue its deci-
sion regarding institution within three months of receiving a preliminary 
patent owner response (or if no such preliminary response is filed, the last 
date on which such response may be filed). To satisfy this requirement un-
der a take-it-or-leave-it approach, the PTAB would need to limit the time 
the petitioner has to decide whether to have trial instituted on a subset of 
the originally challenged claims. 
CONCLUSION 
In SAS Institute, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that the 
PTAB’s partial institution practice on less than all challenged claims con-
travened 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). However, a “trial on all-claims-or-none” ap-
proach potentially raises due process and other issues for both petitioners 
and patent owners. An alternative approach, raised by Justice Kennedy at 
oral argument and by Justice Ginsburg in her written dissent, could provide 
a compromise solution, under which the petitioner is given the choice 
whether to proceed to trial under the partial scope preferred by the PTAB, 
or to forgo the PTAB forum altogether and challenge the claims in court 
instead. While petitioners in AIA trials are not on equal footing as a plain-
tiff in a district court action, under this approach they would gain at least 
 
 64.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 317, 327; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.74 (2013). 
 65.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (case or controversy clause for federal courts); see also, 
e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (“The result will be that this court, instead of 
keeping within the limits of judicial power and deciding cases or controversies arising between oppos-
ing parties, as the Constitution intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the nature of ad-
vice concerning legislative action, a function never conferred upon it by the Constitution.”). 
 66.  For example, district courts already disagree on the admissibility of PTAB institution deci-
sions under current practice. See, e.g., Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Apple, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 
865, 875 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (granting defendant’s motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence regard-
ing the PTAB’s denial of institution of an IPR proceeding); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote 
Control, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
   
2018 EXPLORING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE PTAB AND PETITIONERS 93 
some measure of control to litigate their claims in the most efficient and 
cost-effective forum. 
 
